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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, } 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. 
NORBE'f NELSON aka CARL 
DOUGLAS, 
Defendant. 
Case 
No. 
1793 
APPELLANT-BONDSMEN'S BRIEF 
STATEl\iENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a matter wherein the Bondsmen, Dewey 
L. Sanone and Samuel Sanone, attempt to set a Bail 
Forfeiture aside. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On November 28, 1966, upon motion of Boyd 
Hunnell, District Attorney in and for the Seventh 
J u<licial District, the Honorable Henry Ruggeri en-
tered an Order Forfeiting Bail. On January 11, 1967, 
the Bondsmen's Motion to set Forfeiture Aside was 
1 
filed and the same was argued and denied February 7, 
1967, by the Honorable F. ,V. Keller. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed by the Bondsmen February 15, 1967, 
and said appeal was voluntarily dismissed by the Bonds-
men March 30, 1967. The matter was remitted by the 
Supreme Court to the District Court on April 5, 1967. 
Judgment was entered against Dewey L. Sanone and 
Samuel Sanone on May 2, 1967, and this Appeal is 
taken from that Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant-Bondsmen seek a decision from 
this Court overruling the Order denying the setting 
aside of the Bail Forfeiture and vacating the J udg-
ment or that failing a modificaton of the Judgment 
to the extent that the ultimate liability on the J udg-
ment be held in abeyance until the State of Tennessee 
1 
releases the principal with the requirement that the : 
Bondsmen indemnify the State of Utah in the return 
of the principal to Utah to stand trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The principal, Carl Douglas, also known as N orbet 
Nelson, appeared before the Honorable Edward Sheya, 
Judge of the City Court of Price, Carbon County, 
on the 13th day of October, 1966, for arraignment on 
a complaint filed in said court wherein the defendant 
was charged with the commission of the crime of Grand 
2 
Larceny. At said arraignment, the Judge of said court 
fixed bail in the sum of $1,000.00 whether cash or 
surety bond and ordered the principal remanded to the 
Carbon County Sheriff until bail was posted or until 
the principal was otherwise discharged. 
On October 25, 1966, the Appellant, Dewey L. 
Sanone and Samuel Sanone, posted a surety bond in 
the sum of $1,000.00. Said bond was approved by the 
Court and the principal released from the custody of 
the Sheriff. 
A Preliminary Hearing was conducted on October 
27, 1966, and the principal bound over to answer to the 
crime of attempted Grand Larceny. Thereafter the prin-
cipal failed to appear for arraignment in the District 
Court and the Honorable Henry Ruggeri on the 28th 
day of November, 1966, entered an order forfeiting bail. 
Appellant moved the Court to set this forfeiture aside 
and the same was argued and denied February 7, 1967. 
Judgment was entered against the Appellants herein 
on May 2, 1967, from which this Appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENY-
ING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET 
TUE FORFEITURE ASIDE AS THE BONDS-
1\fEN'S OBLIGATION IS EXCUSABLE UPON 
ADEQUATE REASON. 
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A prisoner released on Bail is regarded as being 
transferred from the custody of the public officials 
charged with his confinement to that of the sureties 
on his bail bond or recognizance. The sureties (appel-
lant herein) are then charged with the duty of produc-
ing him to answer the charges against him at the proper 
time and are liable for a failure to do so, unless the 
failure is excused for reasons which the courts regard 
as adequate. 'Vhat reasons are so regarded have varied 
from time to time and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
but in general it has been said that a default in appear. 
ance will be excused only by an act of God, an act of 
the law, an act of the obligee, or an act of the public 1 
enemy. American Jurisprudence 2nd, Y olume 8, Sec- ' 
tions 177-184, Bail and Recognizance. 
It should be noted that the legislators saw fit to 
employ the general principles pre\iously enunciated 
and did so in promulgating, Title 77, Chapter 43, 
Section 25, 
FORFEITCRE OF BAIL BY 
NONAPPEARAXCE-EXCCSE 
"If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant , 
neglects to appear for arraignment or for trial 
or judgment, or upon any other occasion where 
his presence in court is lawfully required, or to 
surrender himself in execution of the judgment, 
the Court must direct the fact to be entered upon ' 
its minutes. and the undertaking of bail, or the 
monev deposited instead of bail as the case may 
be, shall thereupon be declared forfeited. but 
if at any time before the final judgment of the 
4 
Court the defendant or his bail appears and sat-
isfactorily excuses his neglect, the Court may 
direct the forfeiture of the undertaking of th.e 
deposit to be discharged upon such terms as may 
be just." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington 
has examined a similar fact situation in State vs. Reed, 
127 \Vash. 166, 219 P 833 ( 1923), and that Court 
concluded that an order requiring the Bondsmen to 
repay the State's costs incurred was appropriate and 
affirmed the lower court's order staying action against 
the Bondsmen until a reasonable time after the prisoner 
is released from custody of the other State. 
Patricia Reed was charged with a felony in Wash-
ington, admitted to bail, and the Bail Bond executed 
and filed. The case was called for trial and the def end-
ant failed to appear. 'Vhereupon the sureties located 
her in California serving an indeterminate sentence in 
the Pentientiary of California. 
The sureties in the Reed case contended that Court 
is vested with discretion to set aside a forfeiture and 
stay further proceedings until the principal can be 
produced. The Utah code section previously cited 
appears to vest the identical discretion with the Utah 
trial courts. The Court refers to the rationale behind 
the granting of bail in Washington by relying upon 
State vs. Johnson, 69 Wash. 612, 126 56, (1912), 
and State vs. Jakshitz, 76 Wash. 253, 136 P 132 
(1913). 
Appellant contends that the underlying thesis m 
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the Washington cases are inherent in a liberal reading 
of the Utah Code section. This policy was adhered to 
in State vs. J akshitz, supra, and it was added that: 
"The 'giving of bail' should be encouraged 
for various reasons: That the State may be re-
lieved of the burden of keeping an accused 
person; that the innocent shall not be confined 
pending a trial and formal acquittal; that in cases 
of flight, a recapture may be aided by the bonds-
men who, it is presumed, will be moved by an 
incentive to prevent judgment, or if it has been 
entered, to absolve it and to mitigate its penalties. 
To accomplish these things and others, courts 
have been liberal in vacating judgments entered 
on Bail Bonds, exercising always a broad dis-
cretion and in proper cases preserving the equi-
ties of the public by deducting such costs and 
expenses as may have been incurred by the State. 
To hold otherwise, would discourage the giving 
of bail and defeat the manifest purpose of the 
Statute." 
The Colorado Supreme Court has addressed itself 
to this problem in J. R. Allison, et al vs. The People ' 
of the State of Colorado, 286 P2d 1102 (1955). In the 
1 
Allison case, the defendant was admitted to bail on 
bond and, while at liberty pending trial was convicted 
of a felony in foreign jurisdiction aind confined to 
prison in that state so that he coud not appear for trial 
pursuant to the condition of the bail bond. The Colo· 
rado Court relieved the surety from forfeiture of bail ' 
bond upon offer to defray costs and expenses involved 
in returning defendant upon completion of imprison· 
ment. 
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The Allison case supports its holding by reference 
to People vs. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 P 329, 330 
( 1918), wherein the Colorado Court quoted from the 
· opinion in United States vs. Lee, D.C. 170 F. 163, as 
follows: · 
"The purpose of a recognizance is not to en-
rich the treasury, but to serve the convenience 
of the party accused, but not convicted, without 
interfering with or def eating the administration 
of justice ... " 
It is conceded that factually the matter herein is 
distinguishable from the line of authority just an-
nounced. However, the principle is not distinguishable. 
In both the Reed and Allison cases, the defendant was 
held in the foreign jurisdiction beyond the time he was 
to have appeared in the jurisdiction he was formerly 
admitted to bail in. Appellant contends it should make 
no difference that the defendant was held in the foreign 
jurisdiction beyond the time he was required to appear, 
as a result of a conviction, as opposed to being held 
awaiting trial under a judicial declaration that he was 
not to have bail. 
In either situation the restraint and confinement 
is permanent and beyond the power of influence by 
the surety. The surety in the case at bar as well as the 
cases cited as authority could not perform the condition 
of the appearance bond because of the authority exer-
cised by the foreign jurisdiction. He therefore should 
be excused from the performance upon the rationale 
and reasons set forth in the authority cited. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY. 
ING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET THE 
FORFEITURE ASIDE AS THE BONDS-
MEN'S OBLIGATION JS ESSENTIALLY 
CONTRACTUAL AND THE BONDSMEN 
CAN RAISE THOSE DEFENSES ATTEND-
ANT TO CONTRACT. 
The appellant's obligation to the state is essen-
tially contractual. Appellant contends that he is en-
titled to raise those defenses attendant to contract in-
cluding excuse of his performance based upon impos. 
sibility. There can be no doubt that appellant bound 
himself by an absolute contract to perform an act in 
the future which subsequently he could not perform 
and which objectively could not be performed by any-
one else. 
The subsequent incarceration cannot reasonably 
be supposed to have been within the contemplation of · 
the contracting parties when the contract was made. 
The Bondsmen should be held to anticipate the prin-
cipal' s acts and not to an event beyond his control pro· 
ducing effects not in hjs power to remedy. Appellant 
cannot exercise any influence whatsoever upon the offi· 
cials of Shelby County in Tennessee. 
That a Bondsmen's obligation is contractual is 
abundantly supported in the law. American Jurispru· 
dence V 01.ume 50 on Suretyship Sections 1-3. The 
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nature and definition of the relationship is defined as 
follows by the American Law Institute's restatement 
of the Law of Security Sectoin 82, 
"Suretyship is the relation which exists where 
one person has undertaken an obligation and 
another person is also under an obligation or 
other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but 
one performance, and as between the two who 
are bound ,one rather than the other should per-
form." 
It is the essence of the Surety's contract that he 
will see that defendant appears. When the defendant 
fails to appear, the Bondsmen's obligation is direct 
and primary to the State. 
This direct responsibility being contractual is not 
absolute. "\Vithin the framework of recognized con-
tract principals, the Bondsmen's contractual obligation 
can be discharged or held in abeyance by the doctrine 
of impossibility of performance. 
Impossibility of performance is defined in the 
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts in Section 454 as follows: 
"Impossibility means not only strict impos-
sibility but impracticability because of extreme 
and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or 
loss involved." 
Comments in the notes following point out that 
impossibility thus precludes or discharges a promisor's 
duty. • 
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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the , 
Law of Contract in Section 458 provides the theoretical 
justification for appellant's contention in being relieved 
from performance. It is there stated: 
"A contractual duty or a duty to make com-
pensation is discharged, in the absence of cir-
cumstances showing either a contrary intention 
or contributing fault on the part of the person 
subject to the duty, where performance is sub- , 
sequently prevented or prohibited. 
A .... 
B. By a judicial, executive, or administrafoe 
order made with due authority by a Judge or 
other officer of the United States, or of any one 
of the United States." 
The Bondsmen's payment of money is not regarded 
as an alternative performance which he is still capable 
of performing. Forfeiture as an alternative does not 
produce indemnification. T,his States does not permit 
a bail forfeiture in a felony. No alternative exists. The 
one obligation of producing the defendant had been 
rendered impossible of performance and as has been 
suggested by section 458 (b) supra, the judicial order 
of incarceration without bail in the foreign jurisdiction 
discharged the bondsmen. (See defendant's Exhibit 
#1). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
the principle of supervening prevention by law result· 
ing in a discharge of the promisor. In the case of Texas 
10 
Company vs. Hogarth Shipping Company, LTD, 
256 US 619, 415 CT 612, the Court in its opinion said: 
"Here the ship was although still in existence 
and entirely seaworthy, was rendered unavail-
able for the performance of the charter party by 
the requisition. By that supervening act she was 
impressed into the service of the British Gov-
ernment for a period extending beyond ... the 
time for the charter voyage. In other words, 
compliance with the charter party was made im-
possible by an act of the State." 
'Vhen application is made of the foregoing prin-
ciples, it is apparent as here that appellant should be 
discharged from his performance. The unilateral act 
of the State of Tennessee had made the Bondsmen's 
performance impossible. The appellant by contractual 
stipulation would have to assume the risk of the happen-
ing of the event before he could be bound. 
Contractual defenses are available to this appellant. 
\Vhen application of those principles are made, it is 
apparent that appellant's obligation is discharged or 
held in abeyance until the State of Tennessee makes 
its disposition. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully submit that the Order 
of Forfeiture and Judgment should be set aside as 
against the announced public policy asserted in the 
cases cited by appellant. The relationship which existed 
11 
was essentially contract and as such the appellant~ 
should be permitted to raise those defenses attendant 
to contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOj! 
By Robert Yan Seiver 
Attorney for Appellant-Bondsmen 
661 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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